Introduction
The large differences in the level of productivity that exist between firms within the same industry have stimulated what is now a significant body of research into the drivers of productivity change, and in particular the factors that encourage firms to catch-up with those on the productivity frontier. 1 Common themes within this research have included whether non-frontier firms invest to improve their productivity in response to the presence of foreign multinational firms (see Görg and Greenaway, 2004 , for a review), or intra-market (Foster et al., 2001 ) and import competition (Schmitz, 2005; Disney et al., 2003; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005) . We contribute to this literature by testing whether aspects of the domestic policy environment affect the productivity catch-up of firms.
Whilst convergence of productivity levels from below is a feature present in our cross-country firm-level data, and has been found in other micro datasets by Bartelsman et al. (2008) , Griffith, et al. (2009) and others, there is also evidence that the rate of catch-up differs significantly across firms. This suggests the presence of features of the economic environment that constrain the ability of some firms to make productivity-enhancing investments (PEIs). 2 In this paper we investigate the role played by corporate taxation. The question we consider is therefore: does higher corporate taxation reduce the expected returns to PEIs, diminishing the ex-ante incentive for firms to invest thereby slowing their rate of productivity convergence?
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In his recent summary of the firm productivity literature Syverson (2011) argues that differences in productivity across firms arise from differences in the creation of new technologies through R&D, as well as the quality of human and physical capital inputs, but also from 'soft technologies' such as management and
1 Syverson (2004) shows that in the US firms near the top of the productivity distribution (the 90 th percentile) produce close to twice as much output from an identical amount of inputs compared to firms that are near the bottom of the productivity distribution (the 10 th percentile). In other countries these differences are even larger (Syverson, 2011) .
2 Evidence on other features of the domestic policy environment includes the effects of policy changes related to market regulation (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005; Arnold, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2008) , labour market flexibility (Petrin and Sivadasan, 2010) and trade liberalisation (Pavcnik, 2002; Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen, 2011) . The evidence from this paper might be used to suggest that a wider range of aspects of the domestic policy environment are also relevant.
organisation (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2014) . Traditionally research on the effects of taxation at the micro level has concentrated on its effects on firms' R&D and tangible capital investments. The relationship between tax policy (mostly R&D tax credits) and the volume, or the location, of R&D across countries/US states is reviewed in Hall and van Reenen (2000) , while Auerbach (2002) , Hasset and Hubbard (2002) , and Hines (2005) examine the relationship between taxation and capital investment. The conclusion from this literature has been that high statutory corporate tax rates reduce investment in physical capital by increasing the user cost of capital (Hasset and Hubbard, 2002) . 4 Where new vintages of physical capital embody technological progress this will reduce firm-level productivity and slow convergence.
The effect of changes to management practices and firm organisations on productivity opens the possibility that the effects of taxation on productivity are stronger than would be suggested by this existing literature on tangible capital investment and R&D and, additionally, that they may be affected by different measures of the corporate tax regime. For example, the measures of forward looking effective marginal tax rates constructed by Devereux and Griffith (2003) are applicable to an investment in plant and machinery, undertaken under alternative assumptions regarding the relevant rate of interest, inflation rate and method of financing (debt, equity) and which account for various depreciation allowances for different types of capital investment provided under the tax code. In contrast, changes to the way that a firm is managed usually involve an investment of managerial time to identify, organise and implement changes and does not qualify for tax credits or depreciation allowances. For investments of this type, the possibility is raised that the statutory corporate tax rate is the most empirically relevant measure of taxation. Further motivation for this view comes from Lee and Gordon (2005) , Arnold et al. (2011), and Gemmell et al. (2011) who produce evidence that macro-level measures of TFP are affected by tax variables including the statutory corporate tax rate and in Gemmell et al. (2015) that the statutory rate has a stronger and more robust effect on growth than the Devereux and Griffith (2003) measures of taxation.
Economic theory also motivates a search for evidence that corporate taxes elicit heterogeneous productivity responses depending on firm characteristics. Again drawing on the capital investment literature, Egger et al. (2014) develop a tractable model of corporate taxes and firm-level investment. Depending on their size, firms respond in different ways to different forms of taxation. Small (innovative) firms are credit constrained which makes investment sensitive to cash-flow and the amount of collateral they may post.
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Because small firms rely heavily on retained profit for investment, higher tax rates reduce internal funds and lower levels of investment.
Our conclusions regarding the effects of corporate taxation on the productivity convergence of small firms are reached by undertaking two complementary pieces of empirical analysis. In the first part we exploit variation in the tax rates faced by firms in different countries over time. Using the reduced form model of firm productivity convergence by Griffith et al. (2009) , and an unbalanced panel of manufacturing and service sector firms from 11 European countries over the period 1996 to 2005, we find that higher statutory corporate taxation significantly slows the productivity growth of small firms that are furthest from the productivity frontier. In contrast we show that these effects do not apply to large firms, even those with a greater scope for imitation.
We do find however some evidence that these large firms are affected by higher effective marginal tax rates, whereas small firms are unaffected, and there is an effect from personal income taxation on both types of firms.
This final result is consistent with the view that the productivity investments of firms are dependent on the actions of workers though management and organisational change. Together these results highlight an important heterogeneity in the effects of taxation across countries and additionally across firms within the same country according to the size of their productivity gap relative to the productivity frontier. In turn this implies that the effects of changes to taxation on aggregate productivity growth will depend upon the level of taxation, the structure of taxes, the numbers of small firms and the average productivity gap.
The second component of the empirical evidence we provide exploits a quasi-natural experiment in which there was a 13 percentage point reduction in corporate tax rates in Germany between 2000 and 2001. 6 The reform is plausibly exogenous with respect to firm productivity as it was designed to adapt the German tax system to the EC Common Market (Becker et al., 2006) . We again find evidence consistent with the view that 5 See Beck et al. (2008) and Aghion et al. (2007) for evidence that small firms are more likely to be credit constrained than large firms.
Hubbard (1998), Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) and Aghion et al. (2007) show that firm growth is limited by financial frictions. 6 In this regard, the paper complements the evidence of the effects of changes to corporate taxation and depreciation allowances on investment using a natural experiment approach by Cummins et al. (1994 Cummins et al. ( , 1996 and House and Shapiro (2008). higher tax rates slow productivity convergence for small firms. Following the reduction in corporate tax rates, productivity growth in small German firms increased compared to a counterfactual of small firms in those European countries where there was no tax change over this period (Sweden, Spain and the UK). These effects are economically significant. Our results suggest that the effect of the reduction in the corporate tax rates in Germany was to raise the productivity growth rate for a small firm with the mean level of productivity (83% of the frontier firm) by 1.7 percentage points relative to the counterfactual.
Importantly, our econometric tests take several steps to isolate causal inferences. In our setting endogeneity bias may arise due to omitted variable bias or from reverse causality if there is little deadweight loss from taxing firms that persistently lie far from the productivity frontier. To eliminate these potential sources of bias our cross-country approach includes country, industry and year dummies and in robustness test countrytime and industry-time dummies that net out any time-varying shocks that systematically correlate with changes to tax rates. Furthermore, we use the natural experiment to drive at causality.
As discussed in the next section, the evidence we provide is consistent with that presented by Arnold et al. (2011) and Masso et al. (2013) . They find evidence respectively that, for European firms, higher corporate taxes slow productivity growth in more profitable industries, and that for Estonian firms corporate tax cuts provoke a significant increase in investment spending with the effect most pronounced among small firms.
In the following section we outline the previous literature that motivates our analysis and the econometric model that we adopt to estimate the effects of corporate taxation. Section 3 describes key characteristics of the data. Section 4 details the main results of the paper. Sub-section 4.1 describes the baseline estimates and we use sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3 to test their robustness. Sub-section 4.4 reports on the second component of the empirical evidence; namely, the effect of the German tax reforms. Finally, we draw some conclusions from the study in Section 5.
Previous Literature and Econometric Strategy

Previous Literature
Macro-dynamic modelling has made great strides in recent years in analysing the potential impact of changes in tax policy on a variety of macro variables including output levels and the transitional/long-run rates of output growth (e.g. Barro et al., 1995; Turnovsky, 2004) . While some of these models have been 'tested' by calibrating them to specific country (usually the US) characteristics, in general empirical tests of such models have relied on aggregate level regressions for panels of different country samples, (see, for example, Kneller et al., 1999; Bleaney, et al 2001; Arnold, 2008; Romero-Avila and Strauch, 2008; Romer and Romer, 2010) . These studies have increasingly found evidence consistent with significant adverse long-run impacts from increases in various 'distortionary' taxes including corporate tax rates. Theories of taxation and growth by Peretto (2007) , and empirical studies by Lee and Gordon (2005) , Arnold et al. (2011 ) and Gemmell et al. (2011 , 2015 have also shown that these aggregate growth effects occur through productivity, in addition to any effect on the accumulation of tangible and human capital.
Aggregate productivity growth occurs as a consequence of the replacement of low-productivity firms by new entrants with higher productivity in a process often called Schumpeterian 'creative destruction'; from the reallocation of resources to high productivity firms (known as the between effect); and as the productivity of surviving firms improves (known as the within effect). Foster et al. (2001) show that all contribute to aggregate growth, although the within and between components typically make the largest contributions. The research linking these aggregate productivity and growth effects of taxation to changes at the micro level has concentrated on a small number of the potential mechanisms. In this paper we focus on the effects of taxation on within firm productivity change. 7 Recent evidence for firm-level effects of taxation has focused more on firm entry and exit rates, see Da Rin et al. (2011) and Djankov et al. (2010) , while Carroll et al. (2000) examine the effects of US tax reforms in the 1980s on the investment and employment decisions of small businesses, finding significant effects.
Syverson (2011) provides a detailed discussion of the determinants of within firm productivity change, including that on the quality of inputs (both human and physical capital), the creation of new technologies through R&D and more recent evidence on management quality and managerial change Van Reenen, 2007, 2010) . As already discussed, research on the effects of taxation has concentrated on direct effects of R&D and capital investments. Corporate taxes for example can raise the user cost of capital and reduce the incentive to invest. 7 The database from which we draw our information on firms, Amadeus, provides incomplete information on the entry and exit process. This prevents us from additionally exploring this channel using this data.
Empirical evidence of a direct relationship between taxation and firm productivity is more limited with evidence currently confined to Arnold et al. (2011 ), Masso et al. (2013 and Bridgman et al. (2009) . The regression-based approach adopted by Arnold et al. (2011) and Masso et al. (2013) is most similar to the work in this paper. Arnold et al. (2011) use a large sample of European firms and report that firms in industries that are more profitable are more affected by corporate taxation. Masso et al. (2013) use a significant change to corporate profit taxation in Estonia at the start of the century as a natural experiment. They find that compared to a counterfactual of firms in Latvia and Lithuania the productivity and investment behaviour of small firms were particularly affected by changes to profit taxation that occurred.
Finally, Bridgman et al. (2009) examine the productivity effects of regulations in the US sugar market.
Whilst the industry regulation they study extends beyond taxation to include restrictions on the entry of new sugar beet refiners and imports, one aspect of the policy environment they consider is the application of an income tax on sugar beet refiners (to pay for a subsidy for sugar beet farmers). They find that the productivity of sugar refiners fell as a result of the regulation of this market. This occurred in part because the share of industry revenues that went to the refiners fell because of the tax. As a result, the authors argue, refiners had little incentive to invest to maintain their equipment, which lowered their productivity.
Econometric Strategy
We take two complementary approaches to explore the link between productivity catch-up and corporate taxation. To capture the various effects of taxation on the productivity growth of firms using cross-country data our first approach draws on Griffith et al. (2009) and estimates a reduced form model with an error correction structure set out in equation (1), where A denotes productivity, i denotes firms, j industries, c countries, F is the frontier, and t time 
The parameter 1 in equation (1) captures the instantaneous effect of changes in the productivity frontier (denoted AF) on all firms and 2 the speed at which firms can close the gap with the best firms. We anticipate that 2 will be negative: the greater the size of the initial productivity gap of firm i relative to the frontier in the previous time period the faster a firm grows in this time period. Following evidence from Bartelsman et al. (2008) we assume in equation (1) that firms benchmark themselves against the productivity level of the domestic leader in their industry. The country-industry frontier is considered the relevant benchmark because of differences in the appropriateness of different management practices to different country and industry settings. 8 We allow taxation to affect productivity growth directly (captured by 5 ), because it affects the decision to invest in the creation of new knowledge such as R&D, but also the catch-up process (captured by 3 ). It is the effect on the rate of catch-up where we concentrate our analysis. We anticipate that these constrained and highly taxed firms will make fewer, smaller and less-risky investments to improve their productivity (Arnold et al., 2011) , so that the speed of convergence to the frontier will be slower. In this case the coefficient 3 will be positive. Alternatively, if higher taxation encourages firms to work harder to improve productivity then 3 will be negative. In our empirical work we focus on incorporated firms so that it is the impact of corporate tax rates that are most relevant. We consider possible effects from personal income taxes in section 4.3. Given the broad range of determinants of productivity and the predictions in Egger et al. (2014) , in our initial investigations we use a basic measure of corporate taxation, namely the statutory tax rate. We explore the potential for broader measures, including measures of the effective tax rate based on investments in plant and machinery in Section 4.3. Finally motivated by evidence in Egger et al. (2014) that the effects of taxation are likely to differ across firms of different sizes we focus our analysis on small firms. We test the sensitivity of our results to the definition of smallness in Section 4.2.
We also include a number of other control variables within equation (1), although limits on space prevent us from reporting all of these within the tables. In equation (1) we include a set of interactions between the TFP gap and industry profitability which we label as Zj. This captures the fact that the speed of convergence may depend on industry profitability (Arnold et al., 2011) . Here we hypothesise that greater profitability might act as a spur to make PEIs. To ensure that we capture the inherent profitability of an industry rather than any effect 8 Bartelsman et al. (2008) find that firms converge more quickly to the domestic-industry frontier than the global-industry frontier. This assumption has the convenient property that it does not require that we transform the cross-country data to a common currency. Such comparisons are known to be sensitive to assumptions about the choice of exchange rate (Bartelsman et al., 2008) . The exclusion of the global frontier is, arguably, most plausible for small firms. We test the robustness of our results to this assumption by including in regression 9 industry-time dummies, which capture movements of the global-industry frontier.
that higher corporate tax rates in a country might have on this variable, we follow Arnold et al. (2011) and use (time invariant) industry-level data on profitability for the US as a proxy.
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To control for other factors that affect productivity but which are not accounted for in the above model we include a set of variables denoted by Xijct in equation (1). Within this we include the ratio of government expenditure to GDP and the ratio of government revenue to GDP. Finally we also include a set of country, industry and time dummies. To further establish the robustness of our findings in Section 4.2 we extend the set of control variables to include country-time and industry-time dummies and then firm fixed effects.
The second approach we use to identify the effects of taxation on the productivity convergence of small firms is to exploit, for identification purposes, a large change in the German corporate tax rate between 2000 and 2001. These productivity growth effects are compared to a counterfactual of firms from Spain, Sweden and the UK where there were no changes to corporate tax rates over the years 1999 to 2002. The high degree of synchronization in business cycles across European countries reported by Alfonso and Sequeira (2010), Degiannakis et al. (2014) and Gayer (2007) ensures that economic conditions within the treatment and control groups are similar and further supports this choice.
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The estimating equation used in this section is laid out as equation (2) and takes on the form of a difference-in-differences regression. 9 The US is chosen as the country from which to derive this industry variable as its firms are subject to lower tax rates and fewer policy restrictions compared those in Europe and because it is not included in the sample, thereby reducing endogeneity concerns. Information on the profitability of industries is calculated from the 2002 U.S. Benchmark Input-Output Data 
Equation (2) retains much of the structure of equation (1) Germany had left its corporate tax rates unchanged. We anticipate the signs on both of these variables to be positive. The remaining control variables are chosen so as to be consistent with equation (1), except we follow standard practice in the estimation of difference-in-differences regressions and include firm fixed effects.
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Our research design employs multiple strategies to pin down a causal relationship between tax policy and productivity convergence. Firstly, we estimate equation (1) using country, industry and year fixed effects that eliminate the confounding influence of omitted variables that are unobservable to the econometrician but correlate with tax policy. Second, the German natural experiment exploits an exogenous shock to tax policy and leverages the fact that this affected small German firms but not those in the control group.
Data Description and Summary
Our firm-level data is taken from the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk) and covers 11 European countries for the years 1995-2005. We provide greater detail on the construction of the dataset and measures of TFP in the on-line Appendix A, providing only a brief description here. As in Arnold et al. (2011) we restrict the analysis to firms in manufacturing and service sectors and exclude firms with missing data and obvious key punch errors. We also exclude observations from the agricultural, forestry and mining sectors as well as service sectors such as education and health services where public provision is more likely, and corporate taxation is usually not applicable.
To construct measures of productivity we estimate a separate production function for each countryindustry pair, such that firms' technologies can differ by country and industry. We then estimate TFP applying the semi-parametric method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . This method allows the production function input parameters to be estimated while allowing for the possibility of an endogenous response of productivity to unobserved shocks. 12 The productivity frontier in each country-industry time period is approximated by the productivity of firms that lie above the 95 th percentile of the TFP distribution. The 95 th percentile rather than the maximum value of TFP is chosen to represent the frontier in order to reduce the possibility that extreme data points caused by measurement error affect the results. The lagged TFP gap for each firm in each year is then constructed as the (log) of the ratio of the level of TFP of each firm to the relevant country-industry productivity frontier. As a consequence of measuring the lagged TFP gap we require at least 2 observations for each firm and therefore the data period for estimations covers the period 1996 to 2005. In order to concentrate on the determinants of productivity catch-up, we further restrict the analysis to non-frontier firms. 13 This sample covers over 226,000 observations on 54,787 firms.
The country coverage differs, depending upon data availability within the Amadeus database. The larger European countries are particularly well represented. There are around 88,000 observations for Italy, 8,000
observations for France, 23,000 for Germany, 48,000 for Spain and 32,000 for the UK. Around 88% of all observations are therefore from these 5 countries. The panel dimension of the data is relatively short and is 12 We follow Griffith et al. (2009) in using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) as the benchmark TFP estimation and restrict Olley and Pakes (1996) for a robustness check since the latter methodology does not allow for a flexible production technology and the theoretical model does not incorporate productivity catch-up across firms, which is also a central feature of our empirical framework. The Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator uses intermediate inputs as investment proxies. 13 In Appendix regression C1 we include frontier firms in the sample. As in the rest of the paper the frontier is defined at the countryindustry level. The results are robust to this change.
and 2005 but less than a thousand observations in 1996 and 1997. The number of observations per year is displayed in Table 1 , while the number of observations per country can be found in Table 3 .
In Table 2 we report basic summary statistics for the rate of TFP growth across firms and countries, along with the growth rate of the productivity frontier. We provide summary statistics on all of the variables included in the estimations in on-line Appendix B. In Table 2 , to ease the interpretation of the data we report the TFP of the average firm expressed as a percentage of the productivity frontier rather than the logged value we use in the estimation.
The average rate of TFP growth in the sample is 2.7 per cent per annum. This is faster than the growth rate of the productivity frontier (average rate of growth 0.6 per cent per annum), which suggests that the average firm converges towards the frontier over time. Finally, across the sample the average TFP of a firm compared to its domestic-industry productivity frontier is 79 per cent. To put this differently, the TFP gap of the average firm compared to the productivity frontier is 21 per cent.
In Table 3 we provide the distribution of relative TFP by country, the separate mean values for small and large firms, as well as further detail on the distribution of TFP. 14 The evidence from this table suggests there is considerable heterogeneity in the size of this gap across countries. For example, firms in Germany operate consistently closer to the domestic technological frontier than firms in France or the UK. 15 The average firm in
Germany has an estimated TFP that is 88 per cent of the best firms there, whereas for France the average firm has a TFP that is 61 per cent of the best firms. For the UK the figure is 79 per cent. The average TFP of small firms is below that of large firms in every country except Italy and Portugal. In some cases the difference between the TFP for small firms and the average across all firms is large. In Germany for example, the average TFP of large firms compared to the frontier firm is 94 per cent, versus 83 per cent for small firms.
14 Small firms are defined as those with fewer than 20 employees. Firm size is measured by the number of employees in that year. In regression C2 in the Appendix we fix firm size over the sample period. This has no bearing on the results. The choice of 20 employees is chosen to maintain a reasonable number of observations in both groups. The robustness of this is tested in sub-section 4.2.
15 As the production function is estimated separately for each country and industry the estimates of TFP do not provide information on the level of TFP across countries or industries. The results cannot therefore be used to determine whether firms in Germany are more or less productive than those in France for example. Table 3 the weakest TFP performance occurs in Austria, the Czech Republic and Denmark, although these are also amongst the countries for which we have least information. 16 Here the TFP of the average firm compared to the productivity frontier in these countries is 35, 51 and 50 per cent respectively.
[Insert Table 1 marginal rate indicates much smaller cross-country variation in the latter owing to differences in the investment allowances that can be used to offset taxation in many countries. The cross-time changes in the effective marginal tax rate on investment in plant and machinery have typically been smaller than those for the statutory rate and there are also some differences in their timing. The correlation between these two tax measures is 0.576, indicating that they may be capable of capturing quite different variation within the data.
[Insert Table 4 ]
Empirical Evidence
In this section we report the results from the estimation of equation (1) and provide a discussion of the magnitude of the estimated effects. Some general issues of robustness are explored in Section 4.2 and the effects of alternative tax variables are considered in section 4.3. The effects of the 2001 tax reform in Germany can be found in Section 4.4. As a reminder, in all of the regressions we include control variables for the general level of government expenditures and tax revenues alongside differences in the rate of convergence due to industry profitability. In the estimation of equation (1) we also control for country, industry and time effects except when we report regression 9, where we replace these with country-time and industry-time effects and regression 10 where we include firm fixed effects. To conserve space we report only the main variables of interest and indicate in the table which other variables have been included.
Baseline Estimates
The baseline estimates include regressions 1 to 3 in Table 5 . In regression 1 we use the full sample of firms available to us, regression 2 includes observations for small firms only (fewer than 20 employees) and regression 3 reports the same regression but where the sample is restricted to large firms (20 or more employees).
Before we discuss the effect that these changes to the sample have for the tax variable we begin with a discussion of results for the other control variables reported in the table.
The first two variables listed in the table measure the effect of growth of the technological frontier and the rate of productivity catch-up (denoted TFP gap). The results for these compare favourably with those from elsewhere in the literature. Firstly, growth of the domestic-industry productivity frontier is found to have positive spillover effects on the growth of firms operating behind the frontier (see Griffith et al. 2001 Griffith et al. , 2003 for similar evidence). The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that when the frontier grows by 1 per cent, productivity in non-frontier firms grows by 0.343 percentage points. Comparing across regressions 2 and 3
suggests that the effect is somewhat stronger for small compared to large firms, although both are statistically significant.
The results in Table 5 also indicate productivity convergence is present in the data. The rate of productivity growth is increasing in the relative productivity gap between the firm and the (domestic-industry)
frontier. For those firms with a large TFP-gap relative to the frontier in the previous period (firms with low relative TFP) the easier it is to imitate from others and therefore catch-up with the best firms over time. Similar evidence exists at the aggregate (Bond et al., 2001) , industry and firm level (Griffith et al., 2009 ). According to the summary statistics in Table 3 the average productivity of non-frontier firms relative to the productivity frontier is 79 per cent. For this average firm, and using the parameter estimates from regression 1 and mean values for taxation and profitability, the rate of productivity growth would be 1.8
percentage points per annum faster than a firm with a productivity level 85 per cent of the frontier firm, and around 3.2 percentage points per annum faster than a firm with a productivity level 90 per cent of the frontier firm.
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[Insert Table 5] There is also evidence in the table that higher taxation slows the rate of productivity catch-up for some firms. The TFP gap variable interacted with the corporate tax rate for all firms (TFP gap×Corp. Tax.) is 17 These results relate to an 'average' firm at a given distance from the frontier, and many additional factors are likely to affect the distribution of firms' productivity catch-up around that average, such as variations in firms' absorptive capacity or constraints on their ability to invest. Where this leads some firms to exit their industry it is likely to be imperfectly captured in the current dataset.
statistically significant and positive in regressions 1 and 2 but not regression 3. As a reminder, regression 2 restricts the sample to small firms only. In regression 3 where we restrict the sample to include firms with 20 or more employees (labelled large firms) the coefficient on the tax-TFP gap variable remains positive but is far from being significant at conventional levels. A test comparing the effect of taxation between small and large firms confirms this difference. 18 These results are consistent with an interpretation that small firms are constrained in their ability to make productivity-enhancing investments and are therefore sensitive to corporate tax rates. 19 The existing theoretical evidence suggests that this occurs because higher taxation reduces the net present value (NPV) of future investments for small firms, such that they invest less in productive technologies. 20 Large firms are unaffected, possibly because the types of productivity investment they undertake are different from small firms, or due to better tax planning.
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The effect of all this is to slow the rate of convergence of small firms, rather than prevent it altogether, and within some countries for small firms to grow less quickly than large firms despite typically having lower productivity. In countries, such as Germany, the estimation results combined with the information in Table 3 indicates that the productivity differences between small and large firms and with the productivity frontier narrow over time: the rate of productivity catch-up for the average large firm (average TFP 94% of the frontier) would be 2.5% per annum, compared to 4.6% per annum for the average small firm (average TFP gap 83% of 18 We conduct this test by pooling small and large firms and allowing the tax-TFP gap to differ between them (we also allow for differences in the rate of convergence). The coefficient for the effect of taxation for all firms is equal to 0.112 with a standard error of 0.109, while the estimated coefficient for the interaction of the tax-gap with small firms is 0.322 with a standard error of 0.111. Only the latter is significant at conventional levels confirming a difference in the effect of taxation between small and large firms.
the frontier) when including the effects of taxation. This contrasts with countries where the initial TFP gap is much closer, such as Spain. Here the convergence slowing effects of taxation are such that productivity growth of small firms is below large firms. In these countries small firms continue to catch up with the productivity frontier, but the average small and large firm are diverging from each other.
In Table 6 we provide further detail on the magnitude of the tax effects, using the coefficient estimates from regression 2 to compare the rate of productivity growth of small firms in different tax settings. In the table we compare the growth rate of a firm with a productivity level equal to 75%, 85% and 95% of the frontier in their country at different rates of corporate taxation (25%, 30%, 35%, 40% and 45%) compared to a firm that faces a corporate tax rate of just 20%. These tax rates are chosen as representative of the corporate tax rates across the countries that make up our sample. The tax rate of 40% is close to that for Italy at the end of the sample period, France had a tax rate of 35% by the end of the period, the UK around 30% and Austria 25%. No country in our sample had a statutory corporate tax rate of 20%, but this figure is an upper bound on the tax rates found in low-tax European countries not in the sample, such as Ireland and Switzerland.
The table shows that for a small firm in a country with corporate tax rates of 25% and with a productivity level 75% of a frontier firm, productivity growth is 0.43 percentage points per annum slower compared to that estimated for the same firm facing a corporate tax rate of 20%. In a high tax country, where the corporate tax rate is 40%, productivity growth is 1.73 percentage points slower than for a firm facing a corporate tax rate of 20%. The effects of taxation become quantitatively less important the closer the small firm is to the productivity frontier. For firms with a productivity level equal to 95% of the frontier, operating in a low tax environment (the corporate tax rate is 25% compared to 20%) the difference is only 0.19 percentage points. From this it would appear that differences in the size of the TFP-gap matter more than differences in taxation for the growth rate of productivity in small firms, although both play a role.
[Insert Table 6 ]
Robustness of baseline estimates
In regressions 4 to 8 in Table 5 and regressions 9 and 10 in Table 7 we establish the initial robustness of these findings. In regressions 4, 5 and 6 we redefine small firms as those with employment below 10 (regression 4), 30 (regression 5) and 50 employees (regression 6). The results are very stable across these regressions, and indicate little sensitivity to this choice. We find consistent evidence that the rate of convergence for small firms is slowed by higher corporate tax rates, which are strongest when we concentrate on the smallest firms in regression 4.
In regressions 7 and 8 we test for the robustness of the results from regression 2 to alternative measures of TFP. As described in Section 3 these use different methods to address the endogenous response of productivity to unobserved shocks. We report results using the methodologies of Olley and Pakes (1996) (regression 7) and Wooldrige (2009) (regression 8). Using these alternative measures of TFP we again find evidence that firms' productivity growth is affected by the size of the productivity gap to the country-industry frontier and that the rate of catch-up is slower the higher is the corporate tax rate. The interaction between the productivity gap and the statutory corporate tax rate is again positive and statistically significant.
Other features of the policy environment, not accounted for in the regression, are a separate concern surrounding the effect of unobservable variables on the measurement of TFP. If these are correlated with taxation and affect the rate of productivity convergence across countries then the estimates in Table 5 might be biased. In their empirical modelling Arnold et al. (2011) control for time-varying country policy variables using country-time effects. In Table 7 regression 9 we follow this approach. The inclusion of country-and industrytime dummies has little impact upon the results. 22 The tax variable remains significant and positive.
A similar finding occurs when we include firm fixed effects in the model in regression 10. Thus far we have assumed that the investments a firm makes in its productivity will move it closer to the domestic-industry frontier. Regression 10 relaxes this assumption and allows for the possibility that the returns to productivity enhancing investments may be constrained by difficult-to-observe, firm-specific characteristics such as the managerial ability of the firm Van Reenen, 2007, 2010) . Despite the change in modelling strategy, the key results remain unchanged. Higher corporate tax rates can slow the rate of productivity convergence.
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22 In Appendix regression C8 we test whether omitted determinants of technological change within the firm might explain our findings by including intangible assets as a proxy for R&D. Despite a lack of information on intangible assets for many firms, our results are robust to including this additional control variable. In Appendix E we provide detail on the tax treatment of R&D across countries. 23 In regression 10 the coefficient on the TFP gap variable is larger than 1. However, at the mean value of profitability (26.7) and the mean value of corporate income taxation (0.35) the convergence parameter is equal to -0.759 (= -1.855 + (26.7 × 0.0053) + (0.35 × 2.727)), confirming that the convergence path is not explosive.
The magnitude of this effect is larger in this regression than previous estimates in the tables. This likely occurs because of the inclusion of firm fixed effects alongside the lagged dependent variable in the form of the measure of the TFP-gap, which leads to a downward bias in the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981) .
Additional Tax Variables
The review by Syverson (2011) makes clear that cross-firm differences in productivity are explained by a wide range of factors including the quality of machinery and equipment such as ICT, as well as human capital, R&D and management or organisational differences. In our use of the statutory corporate tax rate we have ignored the effect of deductions against taxable profits that can be made for capital investments which may affect productivity (Devereux and Griffith, 2003) as well as the effect of personal income taxation on the efficiency of workers. This raises the question of whether an alternative measure of corporate taxation, such as the effective marginal tax rate, or other types of taxation, such as the personal income tax rate, are better able to capture the variation in productivity convergence that we focus on.
To model the effects of personal income taxation we include an interaction between the top personal income tax rate and the productivity gap variable in regression 11. 24 In regression 12 we replace our measures of the statutory corporate tax rate with forward looking effective rates based on the methodology of Devereux et al. (2002) . Finally in regression 13 we repeat regression 12 but consider only large firms.
We find some interesting results from this exercise. For personal income taxation we find evidence that this also slows the rate of convergence, the estimated coefficient is again positive and statistically significant.
This occurs whether our focus is on small firms (regressions 11 and 12) or large firms (regression 13). We note however there is some sensitivity of this finding in Table 8 further below, where we find the reverse outcomes for personal income taxation. 25 This indicates both that caution about the robustness of this finding is required and that further research is warranted. 24 We thank the editor for this suggestion. 25 These results can also be seen to fit with a new but growing literature on the effects of personal taxes on corporate choices including location (see for example Egger et al., 2013) .
For the effective corporate tax rate we find there are differences in the effect between small and large firms. In regression 12 we find no effect from the effective marginal rate on small firms but there is an effect for large firms in regression 13. This evidence is consistent with Egger et al. (2014) .
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[Insert Table 7 ]
The 2001 German Tax Reforms as a Natural Experiment
As noted in the summary statistics in Section 3, for most of the countries that make up our sample the rate of corporate taxation was reduced occasionally and in relatively small steps. The exception to this is Germany where there was a large single reduction of just over 13 percentage points between 2000 and 2001.
The key features of the reforms were the replacement of the different tax rates on retained earnings (40%) and distributed profits (30%) with a single lower tax on all profits (25%). When combined with local trading taxes, the statutory tax rate fell from 51.6% to 38.3% (Spengel, 2001 ). Becker et al. (2006) use this tax change as a 'natural experiment' to identify the effects of tax reform on the investment of foreign affiliates in Germany, finding significant and large effects. Becker et al. (2006) describe the motives behind this tax reform as aimed at attracting FDI and to adapt the German tax system to the rules of the EC Common Market. The motives behind the tax change therefore appear to be consistent with the view that the change in corporate tax rates was exogenous to firm productivity, in particular for small firms.
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Equation (2) which forms the model for estimation in this section, considers whether the corporate tax reforms affected productivity growth of small German firms compared to the pre-reform period (1999) (2000) .
These growth effects are compared to a counterfactual of firms from Spain, Sweden and the UK. Small firms 26 A possible reason why the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) seems to be especially relevant to large firm's TFP convergence could be related to large firms conducting more R&D. Where R&D expenditures involve investment in intangible capital they will not generally be included in the Amadeus fixed capital data and hence are contained within TFP estimates. Unfortunately, without data on R&D expenditures and the EMTRs applicable to them, we are unable to test how far R&D acts as a transmission mechanism from EMTRs to TFP. To the extent that EMTRs for equipment investment and EMTRs on R&D are correlated, our EMTR variable could be picking up both effects. 27 Our results using cross-country data in the previous sections of the paper are not dependent on the inclusion of Germany and therefore this large tax event in the data. When we exclude Germany, (see regression C6 in Appendix C), the results are unchanged.
from these countries are chosen because the corporate tax rates remained unchanged in these countries over the years 1999 to 2002, whereas they changed in all other European countries.
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Invariably difference-in-difference regression estimates are scrutinized on the extent to which the control group represents the valid counterfactual: what would have happened in the absence of the tax reforms? To determine this we test whether productivity growth amongst small German firms was significantly different than that of small firms from Spain, Sweden and the UK in 1999 or 2000 conditional on the size of their initial TFP gap and any movements in the frontier. We find we cannot reject the null that the productivity growth rates were the same in the two groups, the t-statistic is equal to 0.01. The parallel trend assumption would therefore appear to be satisfied.
Both of the tax variables have positive and statistically significant coefficients in regression 14. Holding constant the tax rate across time, we find that firms that face higher tax rates grow less quickly for the same relative productivity ( 4 is positive). This mirrors the findings in Tables 5 and 7 regarding the effects of taxation on the productivity growth of small firms. We also find additional effects from the tax reforms in Germany.
Specifically, the results show that productivity within small German firms grew more quickly relative to the counterfactual in the period following the corporate tax reforms in Germany. Again this effect is increasing in the size of the productivity gap ( 3 is positive). Bertrand et al. (2004) note that a consequence of using difference-in-differences with data spanning several years, and where outcomes are serially correlated, is that the estimated standard errors will be inconsistent resulting in spurious inference. One solution suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) is to collapse the data into a single pre-and post-treatment time period. We conduct this robustness test in regression 15, which accounts for the fall in the number of observations within the 28 The differences in the effect of corporate taxation between small and large firms reported in Table 5 and 7 suggest that large firms may also represent a valid counterfactual as they are unaffected by statutory corporate tax rates. We report regressions usin g large German firms as the counterfactual in Table C2 (regressions C9 to C11) in Appendix C. We continue to find that the productivity growth of small firms increased as a consequence of the reduction in tax rates.
are somewhat larger when we use this approach, our results remain robust and highly significant. 29 How large are the effects that we estimate? Using the 13 percentage point reduction in corporate tax rates and the coefficient estimates from regression 15, our results suggest for a small firm with a TFP level 85% (90%) of the frontier firm TFP growth was 1.5 (1.0) percentage points higher compared to that predicted if corporate tax rates were left at 51 per cent.
[Insert Table 8] In the remaining regressions of Table 8 To ensure that the effects of the changes to personal or effective marginal corporate tax rates do not contaminate our results in regression 16 we exclude UK firms from the counterfactual, and in regression 17 we exclude Sweden on the basis there was a change in the personal income tax rate. In regressions 18 and 19 we take a different approach to this issue and instead add measures of personal income tax rates (regressions 18 and 19) and the effective marginal rate (regression 19) used previously in regressions 11 to 13 in Table 7 . Our main variables of interest are unaffected by controlling for other tax events in either the treatment country (Germany) or the counterfactual (Spain, Sweden and the UK). In all of the regressions we find that the reductions in the corporate tax rate in Germany increase productivity growth for small German firms. 
Conclusions
The role that government plays in encouraging productivity growth in firms has always attracted considerable academic interest. Much of this interest has however, been focused on those policy changes that foster changes in the extent of competition in an industry, either from foreign or other domestic firms. In this paper, we consider a more basic aspect of the policy environment of a country, the role of corporate taxation.
The idea that taxation might affect productivity is not new, but its effects have typically only been examined as an indirect consequence of physical (tangible) capital or R&D investments. In this paper we provide evidence on whether corporate marginal tax rates affect the returns to productivity enhancing investments, slowing the rate at which small firms catch-up with the best firms in their industry and country.
We find evidence consistent with this view. Higher rates of corporate taxation slow the rate of convergence for small firms, who are likely to be the most constrained from making productivity-enhancing investments. These results appear very robust to the addition of covariates to the regression, including those which account for differences in the steady-state level of productivity of firms. They are also robust to using the 2001 tax reform in Germany as a natural experiment. The results are therefore consistent with a causal interpretation from corporate taxation on the rate of convergence and suggest heterogeneity in the effects of taxation across firms. Small firms are affected, whereas large firms are not, and firms with a large productivity gap are more affected than firms with a small productivity gap. This highlights an important heterogeneity in the effects of taxation across countries, due to differences in the level of taxation, the number of smaller firms and the size of the TFP gap with the productivity frontier.
While a country's corporate tax policy is, and should be, influenced by numerous considerations, an important implication for corporate tax policy to emerge from this paper concerns the use of different statutory corporate rates for small versus large firms. In the UK and in Spain for example, the recent policy shift towards harmonisation of corporate tax rates between small and large firms (from a regime in which small firms faced lower rates) could adversely impact on the ability of smaller firms to catch-up on the productivity frontier.
Germany and the counterfactual countries over this period. The non-adoption of the Euro by the UK in 1999 may have had some lagged effects on TFP compared to the other three countries but such effects, if they existed, seem likely to be minor for our results. Notes: TFP is measured as the ratio of productivity of firm i over the productivity frontier in industry j , country c, in time period t. Small firms refers to employment less than 20. Notes: +, * and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the rate of productivity growth in firm i in time period t. TFP gap is measured as the logged ratio of productivity of firm i over the productivity frontier in industry j, country c in time period t. All regressions include industry profitability interacted with TFP gap, total government expenditure as a ratio to GDP, total government revenues as a ratio to GDP, the corporate tax rate, country, industry and time dummies. Notes: In this table we report how much more slowly firm productivity would be expected to grow relative to a firm that pays a 20% corporate tax rate and has the same TFP gap relative to the frontier. This table is based on the coefficient estimates from regression 2 (Table 5 ). Notes: See notes to Table 5 . Regression 9 include country-time and industry-time dummies as control variables. Regression 10 includes firm fixed effect. Regressions 11 to 13 include country, industry and time dummies and the personal income tax rate. Regressions 12 and 13 also includes the effective marginal tax rate. -(1999-2000) and post-treatment (2001-2002) period. Regression 16 excludes UK firms and regression 17 Swedish firms from the counterfactual. Regression 18 uses the same sample as regression 14 but includes a measure of the personal income tax rate and regression 19 the effective marginal tax rate. Swe denotes small firms from Sweden, Spai firms from Spain and UK firms from the UK. Small German firms (the treatment group) are included in all regressions.
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Appendices Appendix A: Construction of the Dataset
The information on firms across Europe is taken from the Amadeus database (from Bureau van Dijk). This database is a rolling window of information of 10-years and covers 30 European OECD member countries. At the point in time at which we downloaded the data firm level information for the years 1995 to 2005 was available.
Amadeus contains information for a disproportionate number of large firms. To ensure that the final sample is representative of the underlying population of firms we combine this with information on the distribution of firms by size class and industry from the OECD's Structural and Demographic Business Statistics Database (SDBS).
The OECD SDBS database reports the number of firms within one of 5 employment size bands (<10, 10-19, 20-49, 50-249, >250) , by each ISIC (2-digit) industry according to the census of production within each country. From this we calculate the ratio of the number of firms within each of these size/industry cells relative to the total number of firms in each country that make up the sample. We then use these as weights to resample from the Amadeus database. We base these weights on data for the year 2003. Missing values necessary for the construction of TFP within the Amadeus database meant there were 11 countries for which there is sufficient information within Amadeus and information within the OECD SDBS database. The final sample is smaller in size than the original Amadeus database and does not suffer from the same size-bias towards large firms. Amadeus includes information on ownership, including foreign ownership, only for the last year. We cannot therefore accurately observe multinational firms and this does not form part of our analysis. The Amadeus database also includes incomplete information on the entry and exit of firms. However, we exclude the sectors of recycling (NACE 37), refuse disposal (NACE 90) and utilities (NACE 40, 41) , because of the high share of public ownership in some countries over the sample period. In addition financial services (NACE 65-67), real estate (NACE 70) and holding companies (NACE 7415) are excluded due to different reporting standards in these sectors. Finally, due to the presence of many non-profit organisations in the public administration (NACE 75), education (NACE 80), health (NACE 85) and activities of membership organisations (NACE 91), these four sectors have been also excluded from the sample. The (2-digit) industries covered within the analysis are listed in Table A2 . 
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Other business activities TFP From the Amadeus database output was measured using total turnover, labour inputs were measured using the total number of workers employed by the firm. The cost of intermediates was measured as the cost of production of goods sold and capital as the fixed capital stock. All series were deflated using appropriate deflators from the EUKLEMS dataset. A key issue in the estimation of production functions is the correlation between unobservable productivity shocks and input levels. Firm's production can be affected by shocks unobservable to the econometrician but known to the firm, which then decides on production and factor utilization. The unobserved productivity shock is therefore correlated with factor inputs, such that estimation of the production function using ordinary least squares yields biased parameter estimates. Several methods (Olley and Pakes, 1996, Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) propose finding proxy variables for productivity shocks to correct for such biases. Olley and Pakes (1996) is a two-step estimator of a production function, whereby firm's (observed) investment is used to proxy for its unobserved productivity. The Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator uses intermediate inputs as proxies, arguing that intermediates may respond more smoothly to productivity shocks. We follow Griffith et al. (2009) in using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) as the benchmark TFP estimation and restrict Olley and Pakes (1996) for a robustness check since the latter methodology does not allow for a flexible production technology and the theoretical model does not incorporate productivity catch-up across firms, which is also a central feature of our empirical framework. Wooldridge (2009) notes that the two-step estimators, which require bootstrapping techniques to obtain standard errors, are inefficient for two reasons: (i) they ignore the contemporaneous correlation in the errors across two equations; and (ii) they do not efficiently account for serial correlation. He proposes a framework in which production function estimates can be implemented using a single set, addressing the inefficiencies of Olley and Pakes, 1996 and Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003 methodologies. We also test the robustness of the results to this measure within the main body of the paper. Notes: +, * and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. TFP gap is measured as the ratio of productivity of firm i over the productivity frontier in industry j in country c. The dependent variable is the rate of productivity growth in firm i. DSIZE is a dummy equal to one for firms with less than 20 employees.
Appendix B: Summary Statistics
Appendix D: User Cost of Capital and Tax Rate Instrument Construction
User Cost of Capital
In this appendix we provide a brief description of the user cost of capital. A more complete description can be found in Creedy and Gemmell (2016) . Since Jorgenson (1963) introduced the concept of the user cost of capital, C , the relationship between this tax adjusted rental price and the dynamics of investment demand remains central in the empirical literature. The user cost of capital is computed by (D.1) and it represents the minimum pre-tax rate of return required on an investment project to be profitable (marginal).
where  stands for the economic depreciation, denotes the statutory corporate tax rate,  indicates the existing inflation rate,  represents the investor's discount rate and S quantifies the present value of all the tax savings due to the existing fiscal incentives received by a given investment project in any specific form. In particular, in determining the specific value for S, the proposal by King and Fullerton (1984) is normally followed, who identified three alternative ways for a new investment to become fiscally enhanced: depreciation allowances ( Z ), immediate expensing (including free depreciation) and up-front tax credits ( k ). As a consequence, if 1 f , 2 f and 3 f represent the proportion of the cost of a given asset which is entitled to these forms of tax incentives. Namely, S is given by:
2) The value of the standard depreciation allowance is given by the legal method provided by the tax system, normally one of the following: straight-line depreciation, constant declining balance depreciation or the method of the 'sum-of-the-years'-digits. In determining the value of the firm's discount rate the form of finance is relevant -i.e. debt versus own resources-. The main advantage of this cost-of-capital approach stems from its transparency in taking into account otherwise complex tax provisions. From this framework, two concepts of effective tax rates can be derived: the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and the effective average tax rate (EATR). The former is given by − whereas, for a given value of financial return , the latter is the net present value of tax payments expressed as a proportion of the net present value of pre-tax income, (1+ ) . Creedy, J and Gemmell, N. (2016) . ' Taxation 
Instrument Construction
The instrumental variable regression is estimated following the procedure outlined by Brett and Pinkse (2000) and Egger et al. (2005a,b) . As in those papers, we form an instrument for country 's corporate tax rate using distance-weighted measures of economic fundamentals in other countries. The first-stage regression is
is a vector containing distance weighted characteristics in country 's neighbours (GDP growth rate, population size, urbanization, working age population, and unemployment rate) that determine tax policy in neighbour . We use the inverse of distance between countries to distanceweight each variable. Using the independent variable coefficients and the actual values of the first-stage independent variables we form a prediction, ̂, which is our instrument for . We then use ̂ in the secondstage regression and interact it with the TFP gap variable. Because we only have one instrument, we cannot conduct overidentification tests. However, the instrument is plausibly exogenous with respect to productivity in country as it is determined by fundamentals of foreign economies that affect tax behaviour there. The instrument is relevant given the extensive findings in the international tax competition literature that document cross-border linkages between countries tax policies. Shocks in foreign countries due to economic fundamentals there can therefore trigger changes to the corporate tax rate in the domestic country (country ). The relevance of the instrument is confirmed by the large Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (F-stat: 720,000) that is substantially larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value of 10. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is uncorrelated with .
Appendix E: Tax treatment of R&D across countries 
Austria
Austria provides a cash back incentive for R&D activities. The incentive available for research intensive entities includes a 10% volume-based tax credit on all qualified R&D related expenditures, even if the company is in a tax loss or low profit position. This benefit is refundable to the extent the credit exceeds the amount of the tax liabilities. Eligibility is broad and is not limited to particular industries. The definition of research includes basic and applied research, as well as experimental development within the meaning of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Frascati Manual. Thus, software development can also be a qualified activity.
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic offers a super deduction for costs incurred for qualified research activities. Super deduction: Deduction equal to 200% of the costs incurred during the implementation of research and development projects. Other non-tax related R&D incentives: Cash grant programs for research and development including capital expenditure (CAPEX) investment or operational costs (OPEX). R&D projects include projects in the form of experimental or theoretical works, design or drawing works, calculations, proposed technologies, or the making of a functional sample or a product prototype or its part. The basic criteria that distinguish research and development from other activities are the presence of a measurable element of novelty and clarification of research or technical uncertainties. The measurable element of novelty and research or technical uncertainties must be present even if the subject of the research is known in the industry, as long as the taxpayer can prove that it is materially or economically inaccessible to it, or unusable for another material or economic reason, or had no information on its existence at the time of dealing with the project. The criteria for qualified research are very similar to the definition of R&D in the Frascati Manual. Qualified activities include the introduction of new or improved technologies, systems or services, and the production of new or improved materials, products and equipment, design and verification of prototypes, pilots or demonstration equipment.
Denmark
An R&D tax credit based on the volume of research and accelerated depreciation of capital. Refund offered for excess claims.
Finland R&D tax allowance on R&D expenditure. Carry-forward allowances on excess claims.
France
France offers an R&D tax credit that is volume-based and can be carried forward for 3 years. To the extent the credit is not utilized within that 3-year window the taxpayer is entitled to a refund. R&D expenses are deductible in the year in which they were incurred. Additionally, France offers an R&D credit: 0% of the first €100M of qualified R&D expenditures incurred during the tax year; plus, 5% of any amount in excess of the €100M threshold.
France offers a host of other incentives aimed at encouraging the growth of R&D-intensive businesses including innovation grants and acceleration of depreciation deductions for fixed assets used in R&D activities; as well as a patent box. Starting 1 January 2013, France implemented a new tax incentive called "Innovation Tax Credit" for downstream activities, such as expenditures for new prototypes or pilot assets. This incentive is only available to SMEs (companies with less than 250 employees and sales less than €50M). The tax credit rate is 20% and the amount of qualifying expenses is capped at €400K.
Revenues derived from licensing (also apply to net-revenues of sub-licenses of eligible IP rights starting 1 January 2011) or sale of patent or patentable technology are taxed at 15% reduced rate, with the requirement that the technology must have been owned by the French company for at least 2 years and the sale of the technology to related parties are excluded from the benefit of the 15% rate. Moreover, for the French licensee, the royalty fee is deductible at the 33.33% rate (unless the licensee does not exploit the IP rights effectively). There is no restriction on the types of entities that may qualify for incentives. Qualified activities include basic research, applied research, and development activities. The definition of qualifying R&D is from the OECD Frascati Manual; providing generally that qualified R&D activities: · Present a significant technological advancement when compared to the then current state of the art. · Utilize the combined efforts of researchers, scientists and technologists. · Is uncertain with regard to the anticipated outcome and includes complexity concerning the methodology itself. · Require the usage of scientific methods/protocols to achieve results
Germany
No R&D tax credits. R&D incentives, mainly in the form of non-repayable cash grants, are awarded on a "per project" basis, usually for collaborative projects.
Italy
R&D tax credits are available and covers up to 50% of the incremental eligible R&D expenses, and a maximum €2,5M of annual tax credit for each company. All companies (notwithstanding their legal status), with annual revenue below €500M are eligible. Tax relief for investments in "R&D Intensive Start-up companies" (IST): IST are companies with the main goal of developing and producing innovative and technologically advanced products or services. An IST can have an immediate deduction equal to 20% of the invested amount (the maximum eligible investment is equal to €1.8M per year, the annual maximum investments is €500K per year). 35% tax credit for hiring researchers: A 35% tax credit is available (for fiscal years 2012 forward) for total labor cost incurred by companies hiring qualifying researchers. Eligible employees are those with a university degree or a Ph.D.
(researchers without a Ph.D. must be employed only in R&D activities). Researchers must be employed by the company for at least 3 years (the limit is 2 years for Small Medium Enterprises) and the credit is subject to a cap of €200K per company annually. There are filing requirements that must be met to claim this credit -which can be applied to offset Corporate Income Tax, Regional Tax on Productive Activities, VAT, and withholding tax liabilities. Wages of employees involved in R&D activities are fully deductible for local income tax (IRAP) purpose (while generally, wages are not deductible for IRAP purposes)
Portugal
The incentive consists of a credit against the corporate tax liability for expenditures incurred on R&D activities (net of any cash grants made by the Portuguese Government to the R&D project). The tax credit is both volume and incremental, according to the following rates and limits: Base rate: 32.5% of the R&D expenditure during the tax year. New Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) may benefit, under certain circumstances, from a special increase of 10% of the base rate. Incremental rate: 50% of qualified spending exceeding the average amount spent in the prior 2 tax periods -capped at €1.5M. Patent Box: 50% of income from patents, industrial designs or models registered on or after January 1, 2014 is exempt from corporate tax. The eligible expenditure includes: The acquisition cost of new fixed assets connected with R&D activities, except buildings and land. Wages of personnel directly involved in R&D activities. Allocated costs of directors and professionals participating in the management of R&D institutions. Operating expenses, such as overhead and contracted R&D expenses from anyone other than public entities and/or entities not officially recognized as possessing R&D capabilities, of up to 55% of wages of personnel directly involved in R&D activities. Costs of contracting R&D activities from public entities and/or from entities recognized as possessing R&D capabilities. Expenditures incurred to raise capital for institutions that perform R&D and contributions to funds aimed to finance R&D. Costs of registration and maintenance of patents. Patent acquisition costs related to R&D activities (applicable only for SMEs). Costs of R&D audits (applicable only for SMEs). Expenses related to demonstration activities of approved R&D projects.
Spain
Spain offers immediate deduction of qualified R&D expenditures, as well as offering research tax credits for technological innovation. Nature of incentives Volume credit: The volume based credit is equal to 25% of the R&D expenses incurred in the tax year. Incremental credit: The incremental credit equals 42% of the amount of the current year expenditures exceeding the average of such expenditures incurred in the preceding two tax years. If the taxpayer's current year spend exceeds the average of the prior two years, the taxpayer receives a credit equal to 25% of the current expenses plus 42% of the excess over the base. Personnel credit: A 17% credit for wages paid to qualified researchers dedicated exclusively to R&D. R&D equipment credit: An 8% credit for amounts invested in tangible and intangible fixed assets, excluding real estate, used exclusively in the conduct of qualified R&D. Expenses incurred for research activities that result in a technological innovation for existing products receive a 12% credit. However, the maximum allowed expenses is limited to €1M for the acquisition of know-how, licenses and patents. In Spain, 60% of the net income from the grant and sale of intangible assets is exempt from the taxable income, which leads to an effective rate of 12% for companies subject to the standard corporate tax rate. Patent Box: 50% of the income from the assignment of patents is exempt from taxable income. Credit limitations: If the amount of qualified R&D expenses for the tax year exceeds 10% of the tax due (after reducing for tax credits), the tax credits may not offset greater than 50% of the gross tax due. If the amount of R&D expenses does not exceed 10% of the tax due (after reducing for tax credits), the credits may offset up to 25% of the gross tax due. Unused credits may be carried forward for 18 years; however, there is the option to elect not to be subject to the annual limitation if the taxpayer has generated the credit meeting certain requirements. The amount of the additional credit utilization is reduced by 20% and subject to an annual limitation: 1) €1M if the credit was attributable to technological innovation related expenses; or 2) €3M for jointly R&D and technological innovation related expenses. In order to obtain legal certainty of the refund, the taxpayer can apply to the Spanish Tax Authorities for a pre-validation.
Sweden
No R&D tax credits during the sample period.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom offers volume-based incentives based on company size; a super deduction scheme for companies that fall within the definition of a Small-orMedium-Sized-Enterprise (SME), and either a super deduction scheme or an R&D credit scheme for companies that do not fall within that definition (large companies). Generally, an SME company must have fewer than 500 employees and either gross revenues of less than €100M or gross assets of less than €86M. Affiliated companies are generally considered in determining if a company qualifies as an SME.
